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With a history dating back nearly five thousand years, China
is one of the most ancient civilizations.1 The West often
misunderstands the rich social and cultural norms emerging from
this long-lived history.2 Regardless of the misunderstanding,
traditional cultural influences remain strong in China today.3
These traditions currently provide a framework for societal
conduct that survived turbulent, revolutionary, and chaotic
moments during the latter half of the twentieth century.
4
* Adjunct Professor of International and Comparative Law, Cooley Law School;
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University of Michigan.
1. See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (1992).
2. See William P. Alford, "Seek Truth From Facts"--Especially When They Are
Unpleasant: America's Understanding of China's Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L. J. 177, 195 (1990).
3. CHEN, supra note 1, at 1. Many "methods were used to promote socially
desirable behavior in traditional China, beginning with moral instruction in the home,
which was the responsibility of the family." Wallace Johnson, Status and Liability for
Punishment in the Tang Code, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 217, 217 (1995). Treatment of the
individual under the law varied according to social status. See id. at 218. "The T'ang Code
of A.D. 653 ... is the most important legal work in East Asian History" for criminal law
and is the foundation for all subsequent Chinese criminal law. Id at 217.
4. When Mao rose to power, it appeared that stable societal institutions would
emerge. Instead, the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-58 cast the country into turmoil.
See JEROME ALAN COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
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Over the past two decades, Chinese reforms have caused
potent social and legal change 5 in nearly every aspect of Chinese
life. These reforms, described as Western modernization with
Chinese characteristics, challenged traditional social mores about
the appropriate relationship between the populace and the
government.6  In addition, the reforms fomented dynamic
relationships among institutions and society. Reform also
modified the balance of rights between the collective and the
individual 7 in objective legal codifications and traditional nonlegal
forms of control.
A. Political Pluralism: The Impetus of Reform
Due to the pervasive societal role of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) some believe that real change will not occur until
diverging opinions are officially recognized without fear of
reprisal. 8 The accuracy of this argument, however, is questionable
because conspicuous change has occurred in China over the last
two decades.9 Substantive economic and societal progress will
continue in China despite an existing political monopoly,
10
because self-interested institutions within this power structure
advocate positive change.
Significant progress originated with Deng Xiaoping's
emphasis on economic modernization,1' which created many
CHINA, 1949-1963: AN INTRODUCTION 5-25 (1968). The cultural revolution devastated
China. Chairman Mao urged that legal institutions be paralyzed and dismantled and that
chaos persist for the betterment of society. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 32. Radical
Communist party actions sought to implement a new social order by force and
intimidation. John T. Boxer, China's Death Penalty: Undermining Legal Reform and
Threatening National Economic Interest, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 593, 601
(1999).
5. See Timothy A. Gelatt & Frederick E. Snyder, Legal Education in China:
Training for a New Era, 1 CHINA L. REP. 41,41-43 (1980).
6. Other scholars describe this reform as "building socialism with Chinese
characteristics." CARLOS WING-HUNG LO, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING: LEGAL
THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN DENG'S ERA 29-31, 258 (Derek Roebuck et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter LO, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING].
7. See Pamella A. Seay, Law, Crime, and Punishment in the People's Republic of
China: A Comparative Introduction to the Criminal Justice and Legal System of the
People's Republic of China, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 143,146 (1998).
8. See Alford, supra note 2, at 183.
9. See RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 143-80
(1994).
10. See id. at 3-5.




positive and palpable societal reforms. Economic modernization,
however, posed a challenge for government authority and has
been accompanied by significant legislative changes outside of the
realm of economics. In the area of protecting the rights of the
accused, in 1979, Deng authorized the writing of a criminal code, 12
and the 1979 Law of Criminal Procedure (1979 CPL), which was
amended in 1996.13 Additionally, the People's Congress adopted
its Constitution in 1982,14 which has since been amended. The
government has supported this process of legal transition, which
includes other codified sources.
15
B. Tradition v. Modernization
This Article illustrates the balance of competing party and
institutional positions in criminal protection procedures, a matter
of great interest to Western scholars. 16 It also describes how
China's criminal protection procedures evolved into a struggle
between forces of tradition and modernity. This evolution created
individual rights in the criminal justice system and confronted
traditional forces that previously undermined legal functions.
17
12. See Shao-chuan Leng, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Some Preliminary
Observations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204,205 (1982).
13. THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jerome A. Cohen et. al. trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1979 CPL]. The
1979 CPL was adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on
July 1, 1979, and was revised in accordance with the Decision on Revising the Criminal
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China at the Fourth Session of the Eighth
National People's Congress on March 17, 1996. It came into force on January 1, 1997.
The Criminal Law was also updated and came into effect on October 1, 1997. See Lang
Sheng, On the Conception and Birth of the New Criminal Code of the People's Republic of
China, 2 CHINA LAW 54-57 (1997). Interestingly, a draft of the criminal procedure code
was prepared in 1957, but it was largely ignored because social changes after the Cultural
Revolution were so extreme that an entirely new code was needed. See SHAO-CHUAN
LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA: A SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 54 (1967).
14. XIANFA [Constitution] (1982). The Constitution was adopted at the Fifth Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress on December 4, 1982. It was promulgated for
implementation by the Proclamation of the National People's Congress on December 4,
1982.
15. See Leng, supra note 12, at 207. The other sources include the Organic Law of
Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments, the Electoral Law for the
NPC and Local People's Congresses, the Organic Law of People's Courts, and the Organic
Law of People's Procuratorates. Id.
16. William P. Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws, Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in
Late Imperial China, 72 CALL. REV. 1180, 1191-96 (1984).
17. See Seay, supra note 7, at 143-45.
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Part II of this article considers the philosophical
underpinnings of China's criminal justice system and its influence
on long-lived, philosophical norms. Part III analyzes Part II's
framework of informal and formal criminal justice systems. Part
IV concludes with an assessment of societal pressures on China's
criminal justice system.
II. CHINA'S SYSTEM IDEOLOGY
A. Philosophy: Individualism and "Rights" vs. Collectivism
and "Interests"
The balance between collectivist and individualist thought
forms the essence of the direction and speed of Chinese legal
reform. 18 Historical influences on current ideology trace back to
the teachings of Confucius, stressing the rights of society over the
rights of the individual. 19  Confucian thought designated the
importance of particular actors in society by placing the state first,
the collective second, and the rights of the individual last.20 More
individualistic societies elevate the concept of legal rights by
institutionally articulating such rights as privileges of the individual
that the collective society, government, and majoritarian voices
cannot eliminate. 21 Due to China's historically entrenched
collectivist societal norms, however, what the Western world
perceives as individual rights are considered "interests" in China.
22
The modern day balance between individual rights and
collective interests began in 1919, when Chen Duxiu, an editor for
Youth magazine who later became the CCP's first General
Secretary, advocated collective rights. 23  Duxiu asserted that
China's future philosophical direction should not seek to hearten
individual human rights, but rather to accentuate democracy and
18 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1999).
19. See generally THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS (Chichung Huang trans., 1997); see
also Ronald J. Troyer, Chinese Thinking about Crime and Social Control in SOCIAL
CONTROL IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 45, 46 (Ronald J. Troyer et. al. eds.,
1989).
20. CHEN, supra note 1, at 10.
21. See Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in China,
31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359, 367 (1995).
22. See id.
23. See Guo Luoji, A Human Rights Critique of the Chinese Legal System, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (1996).
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the larger community and nation.24  Duxiu reasoned that
individual rights can confine cooperative societal interests and
sabotage government action,25 particularly in circumstances where
the government would otherwise emphasize that a higher utility
exists when favoring majoritarian interests.26  The Chinese
government believes that society's collective rights outweigh the
interests of any one individual or group of individuals.27 The
CCP's traditional posture is illustrated by Article 51 of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) Constitution, which states,
"[t]he exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of
their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon interests of the
state of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms
and rights of other citizens."
28
Western individual human rights and laws do not have the
same connotation in China because Chinese law is structured to
take away individual rights29 in favor of collective concerns. For
instance, Chinese leaders may naturally favor harsh crackdowns on
crime to maintain societal stability. 30  Thus, public safety is
achieved by taking risks with the potentially innocent 31 during the
criminal justice process. These safety devices may include granting
the police more leniencies when searching for evidence, holding an
24. See id.
25. The traditional Chinese legal system has been concerned with upholding state
control. See Alford, supra note 16, at 1192.
26. See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1977).
27. See Peerenboom, supra note 21, at 368-69. For example, when the state weighs
interests of the collective and the individual, there is no conflict because individual
interests unify into collective interests. In turn, those interests coalesce into derivative
"rights" of constituent individuals. Id. There is a harmonious connection between
government and citizens. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 86 (R. Randle
Edwards et al. eds., 1986).
28. XIANFA art. 51 (1982). A more relaxed balance between individual rights and
collective interests appears in a 1999 amendment to the Xianfa: "The People's Republic of
China shall be governed according to law and shall be built into a socialist country based
on the rule of law." Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty
Years, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383,399 (2000).
29. See Luoji, supra note 23, at 5.
30. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30 (1974). Punishing the
potentially innocent allegedly saves more lives by deterring potentially harmful conduct
and by deterring a higher percentage of potential miscreants out of society. Detaining an
individual pending a long investigation may be justified beyond the statutory period based
on the same line of analysis. Id. at 32.
31. See H.J. McCloskey, A Note on Utilitarian Punishment, 72 MIND 599 (1963).
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individual with minimal evidence despite a low probability of guilt,
and convicting on a reduced or subjective guilt threshold. 32
The Chinese criminal justice system does not intentionally
victimize the accused. In fact, China's criminal justice system is
not founded upon punishing the individual but rather,
rehabilitating him into the collective society as a productive
member.33 Thus, perhaps, the underlying philosophy of China's
approach is quite humanitarian. Those in power in China espouse
a conception of social order and human rights that balances in
favor of the rights of the majority over the minority.34 Chinese
disposition and disagreement with the West is not only existent in
legislative agendas and the face of the law, but also in the role of
the judiciary.35 For example, the court has wide discretion to
assess criminal punishments. Penalties include restitution,
probation, incarceration, and death. The court considers "relevant
provisions of the law and in light of the facts and nature of the
crime, the circumstance under which the crime is committed and
the degree of harm done to the society."
36
Given the emphasis on collective interests over individual
rights, Chinese government institutions and social forces define the
legislative agenda for society. 37  Institutions and political
influences affect criminal law. To understand Chinese criminal
law reform, one must first determine what institutions have
primary lawmaking authority. If a particular institution
comparatively has more power, one must then determine whether
that institution is completely infiltrated by CCP Central
Committee ideology, and then analyze the institutional and the
informal forces driving reform.
32. See Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Criminal Justice Reform in Post-Crisis China: A
Human Rights Perspective, 27 HONG KONG L.J. 90, 100-01 (1997) [hereinafter Lo,
Criminal Justice Reform].
33. See Seay, supra note 7, at 152.
34. See Luoji, supra note 23, at 3. These distinctions are apparent in the criminal
procedure system. "The 'crime control' model of trial procedure, which typically employs
an inquisitorial process, takes maintaining public order as the primary concern .... The
'due process model,' on the other hand, grounded on the idea of irreconcilability between
the interests of the individual and the state, accords priority to protecting the rights of
citizens." Lo, Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 32, at 101.
35. Seay, supra note 7, at 145.
36. Id. at 151 (quoting FOREIGN AFF. BUREAU OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 17-18 (1995)).
37. See id. at 143, 145-46.
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B. Formal Institutional Law-Making Power
Rule of law and legislative power appear to be the dominant
sources of legal authority in China. 38 The PRC Constitution
proclaims that all power belongs to the people and that power is
exercised through the National People's Congress (NPC).39
Ultimate lawmaking power, however, resides with the NPC and it
is the preeminent organ of state authority. 40 While it appears that
both the NPC and the NPC Standing Committee 41 are distinct
entities constitutionally, separation of powers between the two is
diminished because the Standing Committee is responsible to the
NPC.42 In other words, those who direct the work of the Standing
Committee are elected and/or are appointed by the NPC as a
body,43 and the NPC can "alter or annul inappropriate decisions of
the Standing Committee." 44  "[T]he NPC has the ultimate
authority over all legal and government decision-making" 45 and
the NPC Standing Committee's law-making responsibilities,
including enacting and amending laws and interpreting the
Constitution and the laws,46 derive from NPC authority.
The NPC delegates rule-making authority to the Chinese
bureaucracy. 47  This allocation of authority, however, is
particularly complex and has led to "legal fragmentation" and
38. See id. at 44.
39. See XIANFA art. 2 (1982).
40. Id. Technically, what comprises "law" in China might be interpreted in a number
of ways. All statutory sources enacted by the state, including the Constitution, statutes,
administrative regulations, and other rules enacted by government at any level, could be
considered law. The Constitution, however, states that "no law" may conflict with it,
which assumes a superior status for the Constitution above the category of "law." Id. art.
5. Statutes by the NPC or NPC Standing Committee may be considered law since they
"exercise the legislative power of the state." Id. art. 58.
41. See id. art. 58. The NPC and NPC Standing Committee, either jointly or singly,
have critical powers, including amending and supervising the Constitution, appointing and
removing key individuals, approving budgets, interpreting laws and requiring compliance
of all organs of the state. Id. art. 62. The NPC Standing Committee has legislative
functions and the ability to interpret the Constitution and laws. When the NPC is not in
session, the NPC Standing Committee may enact and amend statutes, so long as they do
not compromise the basic statutory principles. Id. art. 67.
42. See id. art. 69.
43. See XIANFA art. 65 (1982).
44. See id. art. 62.
45. Seay, supra note 7, at 146.
46. See XIANFA art. 67 (1982).
47. See Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do With It? Legal Institutions and
Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18-19 (1991).
2002]
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jurisdictional overlaps. 48 Since the 1980's, the State Council, the
executive of the government, posed real challenges to NPC
authority because its many ministries, commissions, and agencies,
drafted, enacted, and interpreted administrative regulations,49 and
proposed prospective laws for NPC adoption.50 Key positions,
however, within the State Council consisting of the "Premier,
Vice-Premiers, and the heads of central ministries, bureaus, and
commissions" are elected by the NPC upon recommendation of
the CCP.51 Administrative regulations are subordinate to NPC
and Standing Committee legislation.52 The NPC has the
constitutional authority to reject or authorize laws presented for
adoption. 53 For this reason, China is often described as having a
unified legislature and administrative bureaucracy.54  Recently,
the NPC prevailed over the State Council and assured that
ultimate authority for lawmaking resides with it. In other areas,
however, where the NPC has not divulged a position, the State
Council will continue to impact Chinese society. 55
Even though all government institutions are subordinate to
the NPC, most new legal initiatives are compromises among
various interested institutions and government organs. 56 The
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate
also affect the criminal justice system even though neither are
lawmaking bodies.57  The Supreme People's Court and the
Supreme People's Procuratorate are constitutionally independent
from each other and other government organs.58  Though
48. Lubman, supra note 28, at 390.
49. See XIANFA art. 89 (1982).
50. See id.
51. See Clarke, supra note 47, at 17.
52. See XIANFA art. 57, 58 (1982).
53. See id.
54. See KEITH, supra note 9, at 83.
55. See Clarke, supra note 47, at 18.
56. See id. at 26.
57. Translated in Supreme People's Court, Certain Provisions on the Work of Judicial
Interpretation (June 23, 1997) (unpublished translation by Professor Bing Ling). The
Supreme People's Court publicly issues judicial interpretations with legal force in the form
of: "Explanations" (how to implement a law or apply it in particular types of cases);
"Provisions" ("norms and opinions given on the adjudication work according to the needs
of adjudication"); and "Replies" ("responses to request for instructions on questions
concerning concrete application of laws arising from adjudication work by the high
people's courts and the military courts of the People's Liberation Army"). Id.
58. See XIANFA art. 126, 131 (1982).
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independent, both are ultimately responsible to the NPC.59 The
NPC Standing Committee has the power to appoint or remove
Supreme People's Court judges and procurators. 60 Thus, the
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate
are, to some degree, responsible to the NPC, as well as informally
beholden to the CCP.6 1 However, the voices and interests of these
two institutions differ. New criminal law and criminal procedure
legislation often incorporate both positions into a final statutory
product that strikes a compromise between historical collectivist
CCP positions and individual legal rights.
62
C. Informal vs. Formal Societal Control: Li vs. Fa
Understanding tradition and culture is essential to
appreciating legal processes and societal control in China. 63 Since
Chinese society has rich informal norms of behavior,
contradictions with codified law sometimes "disturb" society and
devitalize natural norms of harmonious relations.64 Thus, while
the NPC is the primary lawmaking body that balances rights and
interests in society, it is not the only source circumscribing proper
societal behavior. "Legal culture" may be more consistent with
informal societal relations than with new codifications.
65
Historically, informal relationships dominated Chinese society. In
the twentieth century, however, China shifted from reliance on
informal norms to reliance on legal codifications.
66
The first modern day movement to rely on law commenced
with the Chinese Revolution in 1911. This was fleeting, and ended
when Mao Zedong, as head of the CCP, abolished all laws in
1957.67 For the next two decades, the CCP dominated Chinese
society by employing informal power sources of ethical persuasion
so deeply that formal legal institutions could not order societal
59. Id art. 128, 133.
60. Id. art. 67, §§ 11-12.
61. See Jeremy J. Monthly, Internal Perspectives on Chinese Human Rights Reform:
The Death Penalty in the PRC, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 189, 205 (1998).
62. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 405.
63. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 8.
64. See Timothy A. Gelatt, The People's Republic of China and the Presumption of
Innocence, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259,307 (1982).
65. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 405.
66. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 9, 20-39.
67. See Lo, CHINA'S LEGAL AWAKENING, supra note 6, at 10.
2002]
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behavior.68 Leaders ruled by ethical example and did not give
credence to written sources of law.69 They sought to educate and
persuade through moral examples that emphasized social
harmony. 70 This system influenced dispute resolution norms, the
integrity of courts, and the criminal justice system in China.
71
While Western judiciaries of the world are normally characterized
as defenders of individual rights,72 courts in China are not always
seen as independent and impartial tribunals that dispense justice
equitably.
73
The CCP traditionally employed informal norms as a means
of implementing its policies and achieving its goals, but also
recognized that there was an imperative need to fortify the rule of
law with "checks and balances to prevent arbitrary government
based upon extremist class politics." 74 Refocusing on formal legal
controls to fortify state power75 diminished the CCP's informal
hold on society, improved individual rights and liberties,76 and
bestowed heightened legitimacy to government.
77
The counterpoise between law and informal norms is often
depicted as a struggle between 1i and fa.78 Li refers primarily to
"moral and social rules of conduct." 79 Li is meant to educate and
persuade society about proper mannerisms of action and to
espouse that excessive legal coercion is not necessary or
desirable.80 Fa, on the other hand, refers to rules imposed by the
state, ostensibly in a codified form that can be backed up by state-
68. Concepts of Law in the Chinese Anti-Crime Campaign, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1890,
1890-91 (1985) [hereinafter Concepts of Law].
69. See Troyer, supra note 19, at 50.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 46-53.
72. See generally THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate et al.
eds., 1995).
73. See Daphne Huang, The Right to a Fair Trial in China, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
171,172 (1998).
74. Preston M. Torbert, Book Review: China's Internal Debate, 28 J. MARSHAL L.
REV. 639, 640 (1995).
75. See James V. Feinerman, The Rule of Law... with Chinese Socialist
Characteristics, 96 CURRENT HISTORY 278,280 (1997).
76. Today, fa is simultaneously used to empower and repress individual rights. See
Alford, supra note 2, at 183-85.
77. See Concepts of Law, supra note 68, at 1894.
78. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 9.
79. Id. at 8.
80. See id. at 9. Li is based on Confucianism. Li fosters societal resolution based on
friendly negotiation, rather than government coercion. Id.
(Vol. 25:1
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imposed sanctions.81 Li's legal and political significance is
integration between society, the family, and the paternalistic
state.82 One commentator noted:
[B]efore the promulgation of the Criminal Law, we depended
on criminal policies in convicting someone of crimes and meting
out punishment. We made decisions at our discretion, and the
work was strongly characteristic of rule by man. Under such
circumstances, the promulgation of the Criminal Law put an
end to the era in which there was no law to go by, and it was a
historical progress.
83
Enacting new laws in China will infuse more objectivity and
transparency into societal norms. Drafters, however, are often
accused of intentionally employing ambiguous and general phrases
to encourage arbitrary and discretionary law enforcement. 84 Thus,
the interaction of li and fa lingers in the interpretation of codified
sources. As culture eventually coalesces with legal reforms, fair
enforcement of law should become more typical and informal
political influences should decrease. This change would make
reality more consistent with formal institutional structures. The
government called this transition an evolution from "rule by man"
to "rule of law" 85 because leader discretion should ultimately be
restrained by law. Some believe that legal institutions in China
today are more accepted and that governance by fa-like
governments 86 is becoming more prototypical.
Even if informal norms diminish, collective interests and
individual rights must still be balanced within the framework of
the formal legal system.87 China fluctuates between favoring
informal norms and formal laws, 88 particularly where politics play
an important role in interpreting foundational legal sources.89 As
81. See id. at 8. This is advocated by legalists. Id
82. See id. at 10.
83. Daniel C. Turack, The New Chinese Criminal Justice System, 7 CARDOZO J.
INT'L. & COMP. L. 49,50 (1999).
84. See CHEN, supra note 1, at 94.
85. NPC Approves Amended Criminal Law, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 14, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, BBC File.
86. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 406-07. This philosophy began after particularly
oppressive times when the Chinese government ruled entirely by li. See Boxer, supra note
4, at 600-03.
87. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 4-5.
88. Michael Weisskopf, China Ends a Fling at Free Thinking; China Reimposes
Political and Cultural Curbs, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1981, at Al.
89. See Huang, supra note 73, at 172.
20021
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late as 1980, China articulated that even the constitution must
serve the political objectives of those in power.90
Thus, even though one normally conceives of "law" in the
Western world as an institutional structure that iterates individual
rights against the government, in China, "law" can also increase
state power vis-a-vis the individual. 91 This became apparent
during periods of particular social upheaval. Government
authority safeguarded the larger collective interest at the expense
of individual rights provided by the formal legal system. 92 New
legal codifications and later application of those codifications
depend on nonpolitical and independent institutions and those in
political power. 93  In China, the latter predominates both in
enacting new laws and interpreting them.94
D. Uniformity in Ideology Given NPC Monopoly on
Legal Codification
A political party is any political group that sponsors
candidates at elections, and is capable of placing them in public
office.95 In democracies, parties are key actors of societal and
political representation because they provide an efficient and
aggregated voice for society,96 reduce information costs, 97 and
bestow more predictability and compromise to the political
process and government. 98 In consolidated democracies, there is a
relatively clear nexus between constituent desires and the
positions of respective politicians. Politicians compete in electoral
markets as representatives 99 and would lose their elected positions
90. See Zhang Youyu, Why "Sida" Has Been Abolished, 42 BEIJING REV. 27 (1980).
91. See Feinerman, supra note 75, at 280.
92 See Colin Campbell, China Suddenly Taking a Tougher Line on Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1983, at A2 (citing China's anti-crime campaign as one example).
93. See Feinerman, supra note 75, at 280.
94. Id.
95. GIOVANNI SARTORI, PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS 63 (1976).
96. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL EQUALITY: A
SEVEN-NATION COMPARISON 142 (1978).
97. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUB. OPINION 58-63 (1949).
98. See BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN
AMERICA 4-5 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BUILDING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS].
99. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 101, 101 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
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if they indulged their own whims at the constituents' expense. 100
In a democratic society, legitimate government authority depends
on this process and on citizen consent. 10 1 If there is only one
political party in power, however, there is no electoral choice or
debate among groups or positions.10 2 In terms of codifying rights,
democratic participation, negotiation, and the democracy's
evolving institutions determine how rights are defined in law at
any given time.1
0 3
In a democracy, enacting new criminal law and procedural
protections would normally consist of the media informing the
populace on proposed legislation, various groups advocating their
causes, and political parties casting positions that are congruous
with their ideologies. 10 4 The populace, media, and politicians
would dynamically interact and there would be a balance between
the interests of society and the rights of the accused. 10 5 Positions
that weighed the interests of society more heavily would provide
less protection for the accused. 10 6 Legislation would then interact
with the prerogative and position of the judiciary.
10 7
During Mao's tenure, the CCP and Mao had an authoritarian
grip on society that gave them all encompassing rule and policy-
making authority.10 8  This authoritarian grip has slowly
100. See Bruce Bender & John R. Lott, Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical
Review of the Literature, 87 PUB. CHOICE 67,89 (1996).
101. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-11
(1980).
102. See generally BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 98, at 6-20.
103. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism"
Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN
POST-MAO CHINA 1, 9 (Kenneth G. Lierberthal et al. eds., 1992).
104. See generally Ramseyer, supra note 99, at 101.
105. See Peerenboom, supra note 21, at 383.
106. See id. at 362.
107. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1302 (1976). In the United States, the judiciary acts as a "policy planner and
manager" of individual rights and liberties. Id. It rendered a bulwark against government
abuses even if majoritarian policy-making authorities of government are undermined by
judicial decisions. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 25 (1962). Judicial independence operates
along a spectrum. See Jerome Alan Cohen, The Chinese Communist Party and "Judicial
Independence": 1949-1959, 82 HARV. L. REV. 967, 972 (1969). For example, civil law
countries, such as France, intentionally sought to keep the judiciary weak and apart from
policy-making. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 37 (1986).
108. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 384.
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declined, 10 9 and so has the centralized power structure of the
CCP.110 Without a prestigious leader to aggregate power in the
central government, lower levels of government, particularly the
provincial level, retain decentralized decision-making authority. 111
Thus, more pluralistic voices can emerge from lower levels of
government, even though these rules were enacted centrally and
uniformly.1
12
General society can also apply political pressure since lower
levels of government may adopt local regulations that do not
contravene higher law.113 To effectively govern, lower levels of
government require regional economic and policy-making power.
General society can select lower level deputies for the NPC
114
through a bottom-up hierarchical process, 115 and low level
deputies can have policy-making power at the grass roots level
outside of the formal government apparatus. 116 Likewise, inter-
unit bargaining, successful modernization movements, and the
erosion of communist economic ideology make centralized CCP
control over society difficult. With power decentralized outside of
Beijing, bureaucratic decision-making is "fragmented" because of
inter-unit bargaining.117 Successful modernization movements and
the lack of support for communist economic ideology at low levels
of government have also challenged CCP control.
1 18
Even with these impediments to a more centralized role,
China still cannot be called a democracy. It does not have publicly
open debates or competing political positions, and it has only one
109. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO 2 (1999).
110. See Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar, Dynamic Economy, Declining
Party-State, in THE PARADOX OF CHINA'S POST-MAO REFORMS 3,25 (Merle Goldman et
a]. eds., 1999).
111. See James Hugo Friend, The Rocky Road Toward the Rule of Law in China:
1979-2000, 20 N.w. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 369,374 (2000).
112. See Seay, supra note 7, at 147.
113. See XIANFA art. 100 (1982).
114. See id. art. 59.
115. See THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1983-1986, 62, 68 (1995)
[hereinafter LAWS OF THE P.R.C.].
116. See XIANFA art. 111 (1982).
117. See Lieberthal, supra note 103, at 9. Fragmentation emerges in the court system
because of local protectionism, special relationships (guanxi), and corruption. See
Lubman, supra note 28, at 395-96.
118. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 404.
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legally recognized party." 9 Debate does arise within the CCP, but
the CCP, as a body, remains the driving force influencing legal
reform due to its monopoly on power.120 It need not appeal to any
democratic voting majority121 to maintain power and it has
historically defined policy by favoring collectivist interests over the
rights of the individual.122
The 1982 Constitution assumed a socialist unified state that
directed policy-making for the betterment of Chinese society.123
Today, legislative enactments are still influenced by the CCP, and
Party members still hold a high percentage of top government,
police, and military positions.124 The CCP Central Committee,
however, is not the constitutional organ that appoints senior state
leaders. Since the regionally elected NPC is the primary organ,125
there is no official direct nexus between the CCP Central
Committee and NPC's legislative activities. Even though the NPC
has elections, the CCP lacks direct influence over national
decision-making because lower level officials elect representatives
to higher levels of government. 126
Debate and compromise positions in policy and lawmaking
indicate China's departure from a uniform ideology. 127 Over the
past two decades there has been tension between the
constitutional power of official government organs to define and
implement policy and the mere implementation of CCP policy
directives. 128 While "law in China today continues to have little
independent reality outside of the political directives of the
CCP,"'1 2 9 influential leaders have fortified NPC power and
countered the CCP. Such trends allowed the legislative process to
119. XIANFA preamble (1982). "Both the victory of China's new-democratic
revolution and the successes of its socialist cause have been achieved. . under the
leadership of the Communist Party of China." Id.
120. See Friend, supra note 111, at 374.
121. See Intimations of Mortality, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2001, at 21-23. If the CCP
does not adapt to societal and economic needs, the CCP risks losing legitimacy. Thus,
while the overthrow of the CCP would be an unlikely occurrence, unrest and dissent can
still cause government officials to appease populace demands. Id.
122. See Peerenboom, supra note 21, at 377.
123. See XIANFA preamble (1982).
124. See Robert A. Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, 10 COMP. POL. 191,201-03 (1978).
125. See XIANFA art. 57 (1982).
126. See id. art. 97.
127. See Lieberthal, supra note 103, at 239-54.
128. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 384-85.
129. See Friend, supra note 111, at 374.
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become more consistent with China's constitutional separation of
powers. 130 Increased pluralism within the NPC led to this shift in
power.131
Several explanations are often given as the primary influences
of reform. Certainly, the desire to restrict interference with
political branch functions prodded China to reform its legal
system. 132 International pressures that advocate transparency in
law have been noteworthy. Pressure from the international
community, however, is only effective if accompanied by CCP
efforts to achieve reform.133 Outside pressure can only nudge
China's leaders because the true impetus to reform the legal
system must come from within. 134 The chief concern on the minds
of China's leaders has been to implement programs and legislation
that will best foster economic development. Thus, economic
reforms to accommodate state development agendas are at the
forefront of legislative change in many other arenas.1
35
Whether economic reform is apt to beget more individual
rights, political liberties, and pluralism is another question. No
one should reasonably expect liberal democracy to magically
materialize in China in the near future, but societal voices and
interest groups do now influence the Chinese government. 136 It
has been difficult for the CCP to accommodate these voices.
Having various pluralist voices and failing to accommodate those
voices has undermined the CCP's former uniform policy-making
ideology.137 Social forces have stimulated debate with the CCP,
helped interest groups advocate at the regional level, and allowed
NPC delegates to form constituent loyalties.138 Likewise, ongoing
privatization processes will continue to expand private sector
power vis-A-vis the CCP. This trend continues to occur as the
nexus between the state and private sector intersect and more
market-based legal regulations are enacted.
130. See Seay, supra note 7, at 145.
131. See MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN POST-MAO
CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS 51-74 (1999).
132. See Turack, supra note 83, at 49.
133. See XIANFA preamble (1982).
134. See Torbert, supra note 74, at 640.
135. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 386-87.
136. See TANNER, supra note 131, at 51-74.
137. See id. at 56.
138. See id. at 72.
[Vol. 25:1
Political Pluralism
One must acknowledge this system of pluralistic voices and
democratically asserted NPC power within the context of societal
pressures. 139  Diminished faith in communist ideology and
government corruption caused a loss of state control, 140 while
profound political and economic changes have gradually shifted
values and populace beliefs in many regions of the country toward
individualism. This also led to other societal problems, such as
rising crime rates and mass migration in search of employment.
14 1
If anti-crime movements counter this heightened sense of
individualism, it might undermine individual rights and uplift
collective interests.142 This means that criminal justice reforms,
specifically implemented to fortify personal rights,143 are operating
within a sphere of rising crime rates that risk societal harm. A new
equilibrium, defining the interests of the state and the collective,
will emerge as needed, to react to these societal forces.
144
III. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
Human rights nongovernmental organizations and the U.S.
State Department often complain about atrocious human rights
violations in China's criminal justice system. 145 Certainly, the
accused have less protection from unfair prosecution in China than
in most Western countries. China's politicized criminal justice
system is attributable to a struggle among institutional interests
and competing populace demands. 146 The aggregation of these
competing interests can beget legislative reforms, but legislative
changes must operate flexibly within a structure that ensures
effective prosecution to combat rising crime rates. In addition,
these changes must favor either the rights of the accused or the
rights of victims.
139. See id. at 251.
140. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 404.
141. See id.
14Z See Huang, supra note 73, at 186.
143. See Turack, supra note 83, at 49.
144. See TANNER, supra note 131, at 231.
145. Paul Eckert, China Human Rights Abuses 'Massive', says Amnesty, WORLD
TIBET NETWORK NEWS, Mar. 14, 1996, at httpl/www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive1996/3/14_4.html.
146. See Friend, supra note 111, at 375.
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A. History of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law
China experienced periods of imbalance between the rights of
individuals and the collective.147 For instance, prior to 1979, China
had no codified criminal law source, and it was unclear whether
procedures existed to assess the suspect's guilt adequately.148
Judges convicted the accused by their own standards and may have
incorrectly assessed the guilt of individuals as a preventive
measure to protect the collective. Li guided society, but
implementing legal norms created inconsistency between new laws
and cultural will. 149 This is what occurred with the adoption of the
1979 Criminal Procedure Law.
Subjected to the scourges of the Cultural Revolution, the
drafters of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law intentionally fortified
the rights of the accused. 150 Upon application, however, the
details of the law conflicted with its enforcement. This conflict led
to further amendments that took away certain rights bestowed in
the 1979 amendments so that written law and culture would
become more consistent. 151 Interested institutions and various
pluralistic voices battled over criminal justice reform for the next
decade and a half, but it was not until 1996 that these battles
culminated into the NPC enactment of the 1996 CPL.15
2
The first step in ruling by fa instead of li required the criminal
justice system to consolidate and devise formal divisions of labor
among investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative institutions.153
Historically, the functions of these institutions ran together.154
Since each institution has separate interests, 155 a lack of separation
between the functions increases the potential for violations of
international due process norms.1
56
147. See Huang, supra note 73, at 172.
148. See LUBMAN, supra note 109, at 18.
149. See Huang, supra note 73, at 160.
150. See LENG, supra note 13, at 206-07.
151. See INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 164-65 (Wang Chenguang et al. eds.,
1997).
152. See J. HECHT, OPENING TO REFORM? 19 (1996).
153. See Lo, Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 32, at 90.
154. See id. at 100-01.
155. See John Copeland Nagle, The Rule of Law in Mainland China, 2 AM. ASIAN
REV. 147, 159 (1996).
156. See The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 46th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 10(d), at 67, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24 (1994) [hereinafter Rights of Detainees].
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The institutions voicing their concerns include: (1) the
Supreme People's Court, which urges curbing the power of
prosecutors and providing more rights to the accused; 157 (2) the
Supreme People's Procuratorate, which represents prosecutors
and is interested in bestowing greater authority and leniency in
prosecutorial standards;158 and (3) the Ministry of Public Security,
which advocates greater flexibility for police enforcement of
criminal laws. 1
59
While the Supreme People's Court might perceive the 1996
Criminal Law as a victory, the three institutions continue to debate
over implementing and interpreting standards. Thus, both legal
codifications and informal approaches to criminal justice remain
important. 160 In practice, the dynamic tension between these two
approaches highlights the unending struggle between li and fa, and
collectivism and individualism. 161
B. From "Li" to "Fa": Movement Towards
International Standards
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 162 (UDHR)
provides general international standards that states should adhere
to during criminal investigations and prosecutions. 163 In China, an
expeditious movement arose to provide a more objective structure
to criminal justice where little existed.164 This movement led to
the adoption of new codified sources, but the balancing of informal
norms and formal law, however, continues to this day.165 This
section will illustrate the transition in terms of: (1) formal criminal
justice system procedures that restrain liberty, (2) formal criminal
justice system provisions related to trial, and (3) informal
detention methods that permit manipulation of protections
provided in (1) and (2).
157. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 64-69.
158. Fu HUALING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW
138 (Wang Chenguang et. al. eds., 1997).
159. See id. at 137.
160. See Turack, supra note 83, at 52.
161. See Huang, supra note 73, at 186.
162. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 72, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
163. See id. at 72-73.
164. See Huang, supra note 73, at 187.
165. See id. at 186-89.
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1. Criminal justice system procedures permitting legal
detention of a suspect
The chaos of the Cultural Revolution led to a drastic shift to
restrain police action that violated suspect rights. 166 In 1996,
however, inconsistency between social demands and the 1979 legal
standards led the PRC to adopt new standards. 167  The
development of the current law, which is more consistent with
international human rights standards, more fully adheres to formal
restrictions on freedom of action, and moves away from informal
restrictions on such freedoms. 168
The five compulsory measures in today's CPL that restrain a
suspect's freedom of action are: 169 compulsory summons, pre-trial
payment of bail, supervised residence, pre-arrest detention, and
arrest. 170 The People's Courts or the People's Procuratorate
create compulsory summons by issuing a warrant compelling a
suspect to appear and provide evidence or to "obtain a guarantor
pending trial or subject him to residential surveillance. ' 171 A
compulsory summons is a government action that seeks
information and does not, by its terms, restrict freedom of action.
Conversely, succeeding compulsory measures do restrict freedom
of action.17
2
To balance an accused's right to freedom against the people's
right to prosecute effectively, the 1996 CPL permits the use of
bail. 173  Although the People's Court or the People's
Procuratorate can deny release with conditions, 174 a criminal
suspect or his representative or relatives have a right 175 to request
166. See LUBMAN, supra note 109, at 165-66.
167. See Huang, supra note 73, at 191.
168. See Turack, supra note 83, at 66.
169. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 20.
170. See Criminal Procedure Law of the, People's Republic of China, pt. 1. ch. VI
(1996), available at http://www.chinalawll4.com/englishlaw/shownews.asp?id=178
[hereinafter 1996 CPL].
171. See id. art. 50.
172. See HUALING, supra note 158, at 138.
173. Id. at 144.
174. See id.
175. See id. The ability to request bail will normally attach once the suspect has
apprised relatives of the incarceration. The ability to communicate with an attorney once
incarcerated, however, has been a problem in China. International law grants all
detainees the right to counsel and the right to receive "prompt and full communication"




a "guarantor" or guarantee money releasing the defendant
pending trial. 176 Upon release with such conditions, the suspect
loses some freedom of action. For example, the suspect must
remain within the locale, must not tarnish or destroy evidence, and
must fulfill his obligations to the court.177
International law states that "[e]xcept in special cases
provided for by law, a person detained on a criminal charge shall
be entitled ... [t]o release pending trial subject to the conditions
that may be imposed in accordance with the law." 178 The police,
however, are not required to approve the guarantee, and 1996
CPL provisions do not mandate guidance, transparency, or
objectivity regarding this decision. 179
During supervised residence, a criminal suspect may not leave
his abode without authorization. 180 This confinement can last up
to six months, 181 but if evidence is later discovered exculpating the
accused, the supervised residence ends.182 On the other hand, "if
there is evidence to support the facts of a crime," then the
Procuratorate or Court may approve the arrest of the accused. 183
The modification of the 1979 CPL arrest standard lowered the
standard from its high level requiring that the "principal facts of
the crime have already been clarified' ' 184 before an arrest could be
made. This high threshold compelled police action outside of the
criminal justice process to incarcerate individuals because the
standard was too difficult to meet.185 A high arrest standard
mandating unofficial incarceration methods violates international
human rights norms just as easily as a low arrest threshold
permitting detention for what should be protected behavior. 186
176. See HUALING, supra note 158, at 138. Guarantee money is equivalent to bail in
the West. A guarantor, however, is an individual who will vouch for the suspect and be
responsible for his release and return. The guarantor can be fined and even be held
criminally responsible if he does not fulfill his duties. See id at 138-39.
177. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 56.
178. See U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.100, supra note 175, at 514.
179. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 52.
180. Id. art. 57.
181. Id. art. 58.
182. Id. art. 58.
183. Id. arts. 59, 60.
184. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 21.
185. See id. at 21.
186. U.N. CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS at 20-21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.91.1V.2 (1991)
[hereinafter U.N. Sales No. E.91.1V.21.
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International law requires that "no one shall be subject to
arbitrary arrest [or] detention." 187
As for the permitted duration of police detention, pursuant to
the 1979 CPL, police had up to two months to investigate and
gather evidence of a crime, once a suspect was arrested. This
period, however, could be extended an extra month for
"complicated cases."' 188 Some believed the limited duration was
too restrictive and rarely adhered to it. This restriction is another
rationale for reliance on nonofficial means of detention. 189
Today, under the 1996 CPL, the initial incarceration period is
still two months. Yet, the People's Procuratorate can approve a
one month extension for "complex" cases. 190 In addition, this
period can be further extended another two months in "grave and
complex cases," cases that involve criminal gangs and transient
people, and cases in which evidence is difficult to obtain. 191 For a
crime that can lead to ten years imprisonment, the People's
Procuratorate can approve yet another two-month extension. 192
Overall, the detention period can last for seven months, from
-the time of arrest to determination of guilt. In China, individuals
have no right to bring a habeas corpus proceeding193 although
freedom from arbitrary detention is an internationally recognized
right that mandates a remedy for violation.194 This modification of
the length of detention increased the police's official power 195 by
shifting the holding period from the informal to the formal
criminal justice system. This may mean that the terms and length
of the holding period may not differ upon application. Similarly,
more malleability is built into the 1996 CPL since the seven
months is also open to official holding periods of an ambiguous
length when the "suspect is found to have committed other
crimes" or his identity is unknown. 196 Moreover, the NPC
187. See UDHR, supra note 162, art. 9. Probable cause must exist for an arrest. See
Rights of Detainees, supra note 156, at 69.
188. See 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 92.
189. See HUALING, supra note 158, at 136.
190. 1996 CPLsupra note 170, art. 124.
191. Id. art. 125.
192. Id. art. 127.
193. HECHT, supra note 152, at 33.
194. UDHR, supra note 162, at 73.
195. See HUALING, supra note 158, at 138.
196. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 128.
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Standing Committee can approve indefinite holding period
extensions for "particularly grave and complex case[s].
' 197
The rule changes regarding the time period in which a suspect
can be arrested and held once the case is referred to the
Procuratorate contains a similar parallel. In the 1979 CPL, the
time period rule was broad. It permitted the Procuratorate to
request any number of supplementary police investigations,
198
which meant there was no effective limit on this detention time
period. On the other hand, the 1996 revisions maintain the same
general rule of one month with a half month extension (for
complex cases) before initiating public prosecutions.199 Yet, the
revisions limit supplementary investigations to two requests.
200
2. Formal criminal justice system trial procedures
The quintessential protections for the accused are pretrial
rights and rights to a fair hearing. 20 1 These broadly encompass
many protections, such as the presumption of innocence, freedom
from punishment for engagement in protected conduct, freedom
from arbitrary arrest, trial by an impartial and independent
tribunal, and the right to adequate representation.
20 2
a. pretrial rights
Considerable hostility surfaced against the adoption of a
presumption of innocence standard when the 1979 CPL was
enacted.20 3 Those opposed to such a presumption articulated that
to hold otherwise would protect guilty people from punishment,
restrict law enforcement personnel, and undermine a confession's
merit.20 4 Additionally, those opposed to the presumption of
innocence standard believed it would be "a true expression of
materialism because it insists that a judgment can only be made by
reliable, objective evidence rather than by subjective views
inherent in the feudalistic tradition."
197. Id. art. 125.
198. See 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 99.
199. Id. art 138.
200. Id. art. 140.
201. Rights of Detainees, supra note 156, at 67.
202. See id. at 64-69.
203. See Gelatt, supra note 64, at 284.
204. Leng, supra note 12, at 222-23.
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If "the defendant is 'innocent,' why has he been arrested and
a public charge preferred against him?" 20 5 This query is circular.
An equitable court decision in a criminal case depends on
independent, fair, and impartial investigative and prosecutorial
actions, which may go awry in any judicial system. Thus,
presumptions about the actions of an accused, prior to submission
of a case to the court system, are important in protecting the rights
of the accused. In the well publicized "Gang of Four" prosecution
in 1980, it was stated, "[tihe Chinese approach to criminal
procedure is not to engage either in the 'presumption of guilt'...
or in the 'presumption of innocence'... ",206
At the international level, the UDHR requires that those
charged with penal offenses be afforded a presumption of
innocence. 20 7 While the 1996 CPL provides that "no person shall
be found guilty without being judged as such, '20 8 this provision
ostensibly does not conclusively adopt a presumption either
way.20 9 In light of policy battles from interested institutions and
ideologies, several factors suggest the most plausible interpretation
of this new provision is that a person cannot be deemed guilty
before trial. 210 First, the term employed for the accused in the
1996 CPL is "the suspect." Second, the 1996 CPL strengthened
procedural rights originally intended to objectively screen facts.
Third, the amendments lowered the arrest standard to stymie the
occurrence of nonlegal incarcerations. 211  Lastly, a court can
dispose of long time pending cases without prosecution using a
"verdict of not guilty." 212
The Supreme People's Procuratorate also supported the rule
of "exemption from prosecution," which permitted the People's
Procuratorate to decide whether to prosecute, not prosecute, or
exempt a defendant from prosecution. 213 The rule was attacked by
all but the Procuratorate because it violated a suspect's
presumption of innocence, which would also violate the UDHR
presumption requirement. Essentially, the prosecutor made a guilt
205. Leng, supra note 12, at 223.
206. Gelatt, supra note 64, at 223.
207. UDHR, supra note 162, art. 11.
208. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 12.
209. HECHT, supra note 152, at 61.
210. But see Luoji, supra note 23, at 12 (arguing that arrest is proof of guilt).
211. HECHT, supra note 152, at 62-63.
212. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 162(3).
213. HAULING, supra note 158, at 147.
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determination without providing a hearing or legal counsel during
this critical and determinative stage. 214 Assuredly, this granted a
high level of discretion and permitted a prosecutor to treat
suspects differently to enhance efficiency in the court system and
relieve a suspect from prosecution at an early stage. After using
this discretion, the prosecutor could exempt guilty people, without
an appellate court procedure. 215 The dissent from all but the
Procuratorate eliminated "exemption from prosecution."
216
In China, the right to counsel was recognized in the 1954
Constitution but was later abolished, largely because the Cultural
Revolution decimated the legal profession. 217 The right to counsel
or to proceed pro se returned in the 1979 CPL.218 While the right
to counsel "is never explicitly denied in the [1979 CPL] ... its
denial [at earlier stages] may be gleaned from a series of
provisions." 219 For instance, counsel was denied during police
interrogations. 220 Counsel was appointed when the defendant was
"deaf, mute or a minor."221 The right to counsel, however, only
attached once the indictment was sent to the defendant, which was
at least seven days prior to trial.
222
The Ministry of Justice and many law professors pushed for
reform over the years.223 The result was a compromise based on a
variety of more polarized positions.224 Today, the 1996 CPL
provides the accused a right to a lawyer within the three days after
the police refer the case to the prosecution. 225 Before this-at the
first police interrogation or immediately after arrest-the accused
214. See id at 147-48.
215. See id. at 148.
216. Id.
217. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 472-73.
218. 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 26.
219. Gelatt, supra note 64, at 287.
220. See id. at 288-89.
221. Id. art. 27.
222. Id. art. 110.
223. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 37-38.
224. Id. "One proposal was that the lawyer's involvement should begin at the point
when the police completed investigating the crime and forwarded the case materials to the
procuratorate for a decision on whether to prosecute." Id. This would give the defense
and prosecution the same amount of time with the case. Id. at 38. Another, more
extreme position was to give [a right to counsel] during the investigation phase since it
could "help the police to determine which cases did not merit further investigation,"
provide "greater oversight of investigation activities," and uncover human rights abuses.
IdL
225. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 33.
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has this right but need not be informed of a right to counsel.
Within three days of prosecutor receipt of the case, however, the
prosecution must inform the accused of his right to counsel.226
Defense counsel must also be able to comment on the case and the
Procuratorate must listen to the defense counsel's position.227
International law states that some right to counsel must
exist 228 for the accused to the extent necessary to ensure a "fair"
hearing that affords "all the guarantees necessary for [a]
defence." 229 Yet, due to the dissimilarities among criminal law
systems, the timing and extent of this right are ambiguous issues.
Also, international norms suggest a broad view of the right-the
right to know counsel is available. 230
Over time, the trend has been to provide counsel at an earlier
stage in the criminal justice process. In the investigation phase, the
accused has a limited right to counsel. 231 To aptly ensure a fair
hearing, regardless of financial status, the 1996 CPL provides for
legal aid under given circumstances. 232 The People's Court may
designate a lawyer if the accused has not entrusted one for his
defense, "due to financial difficulties or other reasons." 233 This
availability of counsel without regard to financial ability is
ostensibly consistent with international standards requiring a fair
hearing. Evidently, China is readily providing such counsel.
While these rules on their face seem consistent with
international standards, exceptions to the right to counsel are
problematic, especially regarding denials based on expansive
definitions of "state secrets." 234 If the underlying offense relates
to state secrets or if advocacy of a suspect's individual rights might
infringe on state interests or secrets, then in practice, the right to
counsel is denied. The right to counsel can be marginalized in
several other ways. First, lawyers in China have weak status.
226. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 39.
227. Id.
228. U.N. Sales No. E. 91.IV.2, supra note 186, at 120.
229. UDHR, supra note 162, arts. 10-11.
230. See 1988 U.N.Y.B. 510, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.100, supra note 175, at 511-12; see
also International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S.
171,176 (hereinafter ICCPR).
231. See id. at 38-39.
232. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 34.
233. Id.
234. See generally Timothy A. Gelatt, The New Chinese State Secrets Law, 22
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255 (1989).
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Second, the law restricts advocating "too forcefully" on behalf of
clients. Third, attorneys have difficulty determining which
documents they need for particular cases and whether those
documents contain state secrets. Finally, the state might employ
intimidation techniques on defense lawyers.
235
b. right to a fair hearing
Human rights activists have raised numerous attacks on the
general characteristics of China's court system. However, the
general structure and jurisdiction of courts that handle criminal
cases do not raise pervasive quandaries. The Primary People's
Court is the court of first instance handling ordinary criminal
cases,236 while the Intermediate People's Court has jurisdiction
over criminal cases that involve life imprisonment or the death
penalty.237 It is how cases are handled within these courts that has
been said to raise complications.
Prior to the late 1980s, China's inquisitorial trial process did
not adequately protect the rights of the accused because the
pretrial review made the trial a sham. For example, the judge
acted like a prosecutor, and the adjudication committee could
intervene in a nontransparent manner. China has since adopted
more adversarial criminal justice system procedures. 238 This
should provide more transparency and international consistency to
the judicial process239 and be a victory for the integrity of
courts.240 Still, this was a long fought battle between interested
institutions.24
1
Individual judges' actions are occasionally unfair in the
criminal justice process.242 For example, judges and prosecutors
235. Elisabeth Rosenthal, In China's Legal Evolution, the Lawyers are Handcuffed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2000, at Al.
236. 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 14.
237. See id. art. 15.
238. See Lo, Criminal Justice Reform, supra note 32, at 310-11 (explaining that
adversarial systems publicize proceedings).
239. See UDHR, supra note 162, at 71-72.
240. See HUALING, supra note 158, at 152-54. The amendment made important
changes to the former criminal justice process. For example, judges no longer review
documents before trial. Also, court adjudication committees only intervene if a panel
decides or if a panel is unable to reach a decision. In addition, witnesses can be
questioned and parties can present evidence. Id.
241. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 67-69.
242. The right to a public trial is provided for in the Xianfa. See XIANFA art. 125
(1982).
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might employ coercive measures to obtain more evidence in order
to support a guilty verdict.243 In addition, although judges and
lawyers may be impartial, Party leadership can influence the
justice system.244 Nevertheless, there is evidence that China has
made vital improvements to its "accessibility and credibility" of
courts.
24 5
One improvement is China's diminished use of li, and
increased use of fa, in the criminal justice process. This change
decreases the potential for judicial partiality. In the past, judges
had substantial leniency and flexibility in defining a crime.246
They were able to flexibly construct crimes premised on codified
punishable behavior even though the action at hand did not meet
the elements of a formal crime.247 To deal with this problem, the
number of articles in the amended Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure Law was increased in order to more fully define
crimes.248 The use of specific definitions ensured that conviction
would only occur in accordance with exact and objective code
provisions, thus eliminating judicial freedom to mischaracterize a
defendant's conduct in order to make it fit a particular crime. 249
A clear definition of crime is important to ensure fairness and
due process, and apprise individuals of criminally punishable
actions.250 While the 1996 CPL certainly improves the degree of
precision by delineating what is criminally punishable behavior,
one particularly problematic area remains. Crimes are also listed
according to whether they endanger "state security,"' 251 a
categorization that is equivalent to the former
counterrevolutionary line of crimes. Since political interests define
when a particular set of facts undermine "state security," the state
has a broad purview of discretion to charge individuals with
243. Ruth Youngblood, Chinese Judge Admits Coercive Measures, UPI, July 18, 1996,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
244. See Leng, supra note 12, at 224. The CCP is the only permitted political party and
it dominates the NPC, which has control over the judiciary. Judicial autonomy is then
restrained by both the local and national CCP structure. See Lubman, supra note 28, at
394-96.
245. Id at 388.





251. China: Whose Security? "State Security" in China's New Criminal Code 9 HUM.
RTs. WATCH]ASIA, 50-52 (1997).
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offenses. All four of China's constitutions have given citizens a
freedom of speech,252 which international law recognizes as a
fundamental international right.253  However, since political
dissent is perceived to endanger state security, the justification for
punishing many individuals is not consistent with international
norms and leads to arbitrary and unfair prosecutions.
The right to appeal criminal convictions has long existed, and
today the individual convicted has the right to one appeal. 254 The
defendant must appeal within ten days.255 Then the appellate
court has the option to affirm the judgment, revise the judgment,
or remand the case for a new trial. 256 The appellate court must
make a "complete review of the facts... and the application of law
in the judgment of first instance." 257 The implementation of open-
court appeals improved the transparency of the appeal process. 258
Although the appeals process has improved, appeal rates
have declined over time probably because of their lack of success,
and the possibility that a new sentence could impose a stricter
penalty.259 The 1996 CPL did not intend to decrease appeal
rates.260 However, if cultural notions of accepting responsibility
and punishment for one's actions are still intact in China, and
criminal procedure law changes have resulted in more accurately
assessing guilt, then it is unlikely that a higher percentage of
inmates will complain about incorrect decisions.
China has a death penalty, but because approximately half of
the countries of the world still have one,261 this does not violate
international law's right to life as long as the death penalty is
imposed for a justified offense. 262  However, the Chinese
252. Luoji, supra note 23, at 8.
253. See UDHR, supra note 162, at 74-75.
254. See 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 129.
255. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 183.
256. Id. art. 189.
257. Id. art. 186. One problem is that this system permits double jeopardy because
both the local People's Procuratorates and the victim are able to protest and appeal a
judgment. See id. art. 185; see also Huang, supra note 73, at 184.
258. See 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 187.
259. HECHT, supra note 152, at 70-71.
260. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 190.
261. See Monthly, supra note 61, at 195. China sentenced more people to death in the
1990s than all other nations combined. China, however, holds nearly one-fourth of the
world's population. Thus, this may not be an extraordinary statistic. Id.
262. Customary international law is formed "as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law." U.N. CHARTER, art. 38(b); see generally: DAVID J. BEDERMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 14-24 (2001) (on establishing customary
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procedures involved in employing the death penalty might violate
human rights263 by being tantamount to torture or by violating due
process protections.
264
The summary execution process provides an example. In
1983, the NPC Standing Committee enacted a decision requiring
an expeditious criminal justice process in death penalty cases.
265
According to the Decision, courts could convict and execute
individuals within days of their arrest.266 Now eliminated, this
expedited process is illustrative of an official government policy
that supported societal stability over individual rights either
because the quick process provided an example that would deter
criminal conduct or because rehabilitation of violators was not
expected.267
3. Punishments outside the formal criminal justice system
Police action in China outside of the context of the formal
criminal justice system lacks consistency. There are codified rules
specifying how to treat suspects, but norms and systems
extraneous to this formal criminal justice system, can undermine
such rules. In other words, the criminal justice system employs
long-lived cultural norms-li-to assist in structuring society and
to lessen reliance on the formal criminal justice system-fa. The
extent and degree to which administrative sanctions are employed
has steadily decreased and the criminal justice process is now more
consistent with what is on paper.268  There are two more
fundamental procedures that are outside the formal criminal
international law). The United Nations has committed itself to abolishing the death
penalty in all countries. G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94,
U.N. Doc. A/8588 (1971) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2857].
263. See Boxer, supra note 4, at 605-07.
264. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
1999 COUNTRY REP. ON HUM. RTS. PRACTICES § 1(e), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/284.htm. (Feb. 3, 2000).
265. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding
the Severe Punishment of Criminals Who Seriously Endanger Public Security, adopted at
the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress
and promulgated for implementation by Order No. 3 of the President of the People's
Republic of China on Sept. 2, 1983; reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA: 1983-1986 32-33 (Legislative Affairs Comm'n of the Standing Comm. of the
People's Republic of China Ed., Foreign Language Press 1987).
266. See Boxer, supra note 4, at 605-06.




justice process: "shelter and investigation" (SI) and "reeducation
through labor." The former was abolished, but the latter still
exists. 269
The CCP transition from relying on li, as its primary power
source, to fa remains an irresolvable contradiction. 270 Today, it is
imperative to the CCP's credibility and control to emphasize the
rule of law. This emphasis, however, is apt to beget other
pressures that will undermine that control. At the essence of this
contradiction are dichotomies "between law and discipline or
administration," and between "formal and informal
proceedings." 271  Administrative and informal methods of
punishment are more consistent with li and modifying behavioral
norms. In contrast, legal and formal criminal justice procedures do
not aspire to instill new behavioral norms, but rather, these
procedures aspire to guarantee individual rights and restrict
government action.
"[L]aw" is distinct from "discipline" or "administration." To
understand the scope of the concept of law, therefore, it is
necessary to map out the realm of discipline and administration
and to demarcate the border between these areas and law.
Disciplinary and administrative sanctions are, like legal
sanctions, imposed for transgressions against rules of conduct.
The two differ theoretically in that the term "administrative
sanctions" usually means sanctions imposed by the state as
state, whereas disciplinary sanctions are imposed by one's work
unit, such as a factory, or some other organization of which one
is a member, such as the Party or a labor union. When,
however, as is frequent in China, the employer is the state or
the organization is the Party, there tends to be little practical
distinction between the two. What is important about
disciplinary and administrative sanctions are that although they
are explicitly differentiated in theory and practice from "legal"
sanctions, they can, like legal sanctions, be imposed with the
authority of the state.
272
In the early 1960s, the CCP legislatively authorized SI as an
administrative procedure outside the formal criminal justice
269. Punishment Without Crime: Administrative Detention, AMNESTY INT'L, Sept.
1991, at 5-14 [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L].
270. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 399.
271. Concepts of Law, supra note 68, at 1898-1901.
272. Id. at 1898.
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system. 273 The procedure was enacted because of the societal
instability caused by the mass incursion of migrants searching for
food during the Great Leap Forward-one of Mao's revolutions in
which he strove to push China toward his ideal state of
communism.274 SI was an efficient method for rounding up
migrants, temporarily detaining them, and returning them to rural
areas. 275 This system lasted for nearly two decades and was
presumably eliminated in 1980 only to rise again in 1983.276 While
the government ostensibly emphasized fa by eliminating SI and
enacting new criminal laws and procedures, the instability of social
order and the lack of adequate resources to sustain new legal
institutions led the government to re-institute SI and re-education
through labor.277  Even though this system was effective in
safeguarding the interests of the collective, the process was the
gravest violation of international human rights in the Chinese
criminal justice process. This is because international law requires
that "[a]nyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law
to exercise judicial power." 278
SI would not have received such vehement criticism if it had
operated according to some form of codified law that provided due
process protections. The Ministry of Public Security subjected two
types of people to SI: (1) those committing "itinerant crimes," and
suspects that refuse to identify themselves by providing their
correct name, address, and background; 279 and (2) those suspected
of committing "group crimes" or multiple crimes. 280 SI was
overused because police were hesitant to apply for formal arrests
since arrest standards were too stringent.281 The codified law
required the establishment of the "principal facts" of the crime
before an arrest was made.282 Since SI provided an easier way for
273. See generally, Notice of the Ministry of Public Security Concerning Strict Control
of the Use of the Method of Shelter and Investigation (1985), CHINESE LAW &
GOVERNMENT, 38 (1994) [hereinafter Notice of the Ministry of Public Security].
274. See generally, AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 269, at 7.
275. HECHT, supra note 152, at 22.
276. Id. at 21-22.
277. See Concepts of Law, supra note 68, at 1895-96.
278. See ICCPR, supra note 230, art. 9(3), at 175.
279. See Notice of the Ministry of Public Security, supra note 273, at 38.
280. Id. at 39.
281. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 21-23.
282. Id. at 21.
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the police to resolve the migration problem outside the formal
criminal justice system, it was not subject to formal legal checks on
actions of the authorities.
283
These controversies gave way to ongoing battles among rival
institutions within the Chinese government over the use of SI:
Concerned that indiscriminate application of "shelter and
investigation" was damaging the public image of the police, the
Ministry of Public Security sought on several occasions to
impose tighter controls on its use, but apparently without
success. It also tried to persuade the NPC to enact a law on
"shelter and investigation" and thereby place it on a more
secure legal footing. However, these efforts also failed,
reportedly due to broad opposition by the courts, procuratorate
and the NPC itself.284
SI undermined many procedural protections and violated
international law norms since eighty to ninety percent of those
incarcerated were first detained under S12 85 and were imprisoned
without a finding of guilt. Some detainees were held for up to ten
years286 even though SI was supposed to only last for a maximum
of three months.287 Of those incarcerated under SI, sixty to ninety
percent were later determined innocent. 288 Also, the same prison
conditions existed for SI detainees as for those formally
convicted.289 SI was abolished in 1996290 after scathing attacks291
and when the arrest standard was lowered from "the principal
facts" of the case to "evidence to prove that a suspect committed
certain criminal acts."292  Despite the elimination of SI, other
informal administrative actions, such as "reeducation through
labor,"293 might still violate international prohibitions against
283. Id. at 23.
284. Id. at 23-24.
285. Id. at 22.
286. Id. at 23.
287. Notice of the Ministry of Public Security, supra note 273, at 39.
288. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 269, at 14. This violates the UDHR equal protection
provisions. See UDHR, supra note 162, arts. 72-73.
289. See Gelatt, supra note 64, at 314.
290. New Laws to Protect the Innocent, CHINA DAILY, March 23, 1996, at 4; HUALING,
supra note 158, at 137-38. Some wonder whether it was really abolished. See Huang,
supra note 73, at 179-80.
291. See AMNESTY INT'L,supra note 269, at 5-6.
292. HAULING, supra note 158, at 135-38.
293. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 269, at 4.
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involuntary servitude 294 and due process norms because suspects
are treated like prisoners without a proper conviction.
295
"Reeducation through labor" rehabilitates the individual so
that he can become a productive member of society.296 Recently,
the U.N. high commissioner for human rights vigorously attacked
this activity because of thousands of cases that reported severe
abuse in the system.2 97 Since it is an administrative form of
punishment managed outside the formal criminal justice system, 2
98
it is not subject to official protection of rights. In 1996, the PRC
stated that over two hundred thousand citizens were being held in
"reeducation through labor" camps. 299
Given the formal legal system, the adoption of codified
standards, and the recent elimination of half of the notorious
pseudo-official administrative detention programs, a third category
of criminal procedure violations has still been said to occur outside
of the formal system. Stories about the use of tactics such as fraud,
threats, and torture in China pervade the media despite China's
claims, internationally 300 and domestically,30 1 that these measures
can be legitimate police techniques. 30 2 For example, the use of
evidence gathered from overly aggressive police and prosecutorial
techniques is a current issue. As with most matters involving the
balance between prosecutorial and individual rights, the Supreme
People's Court is at the forefront in placing limits on the use of
such evidence in criminal cases.
30 3
Likewise, while China "does not permit.., monitoring of its
prisons or re-education through labor camps," the conditions in
these incarceration programs can violate human rights
standards.30 4 Human rights protections are specified in the Prison
Law and it is a crime for prison police to violate those rights.
294. UDHR, supra note 162, art. 4.
295. See Gelatt, supra note 64, at 313-14.
296. See HAULING, supra note 158, at 134.
297. China: The Same to You, Too, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3,2001, at 38-39.
298. See HAULING, supra note 158, at 134.
299. Giles Hewitt, Wang Dan Heads for the Chinese Gulag, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 30, 1996, available at LEXIS, News Library, Allasi File.
300. See Rights of Detainees, supra note 156, at 76.
301. See 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 32. It is the People's Procuratorate's job to
investigate such abuses. Id. art. 52.
302. See China: The Same to You, Too, supra note 297, at 38-39.
303. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 68-69.
304. See Turack, supra note 83, at 67-69.
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Nonetheless, it is not what the law says, but instead what can be
hidden and go undetected, that often supplants individual rights.
30 5
IV. SOCIETAL PRESSURES
In China, as described up to this point, there is currently a
movement that elevates individual rights relative to collective
interests. The 1979 CPL established some fully protected
individual rights.30 6 That protection, however, gave way to a
melange of noncodified exceptions to the criminal code and to an
abysmal chasm between codified law and reality.30 7 For instance,
while using li to control societal conduct is more consistent with
administrative detentions, it seems that societal pressure has been
pushing for more objectivity and transparency by eliminating
nonofficial processes of detention.30 8 To respond to this problem,
the CCP and various government organs have remedied individual
rights abuses.30 9 By passing the 1996 amendments to the 1979
CPL, now, instead of having opaque exceptions that are outside of
the code, exceptions and standards are apparent in the written law
and provide more transparency. Even though human rights abuses
and violations often still persist, 310 aggrieved individuals now have
more tangible ground to stand on.311 Even so, others comment
that legal reform in codified sources still has significant drawbacks
in practice. 312
Consider the three important overarching policies in the new
Criminal Law that on their face reduce the degree of power abuse
in the criminal justice system: (1) penalties imposed must coincide
with the criminal act, (2) equality for all before the law, and (3)
only explicitly defined crimes are punished. In contrast, pursuant
305. Id. at 67-69.
306. See generally, 1979 CPL, supra note 13.
307. Turack, supra note 83, at 52-53.
308. See HECHT, supra note 152, at 19-32.
309. For instance, individuals can sue administrative agencies for arbitrary
administrative actions under the Administrative Litigation Law of 1990. See
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW [APL] art. 11 (P.R.C.), http://www.qis.net/
chinalaw/lawtranl.htm. In 1995, fifty thousand cases were brought under this Law.
Plaintiffs, however, still lost the majority of cases. See Lubman, supra note 28, at 392-93.
310. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, In China's Legal Evolution, the Lawyers are Handcuffed.
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2000, at Al, A10.
311. New Criminal Law Enshrines Rule of Law, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Mar. 17, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File [hereinafter
BBC SUMMARYJ.
312. See Boxer, supra note 4, at 613-15.
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to the 1979 CPL, crimes were "flexibly created" without a precise
definition in the code.
313
China, historically, has not supported equality for all before
the law.314 In fact, at the essence of Confucian ideology is that
individual differences are accommodated to stabilize societal
relations.315 This tradition continued in Mao's China until the
Cultural Revolution, when the CCP finally announced that since
capitalist notions of inequality and the "enemy" bourgeois class
were finally beaten, "nationality, race, sex, occupation, social
origin, religious belief, education, property status, or duration of
residence" 3 16 or Party affiliation 317 were no longer factors in the
judgment of guilt or penalties. Instead, those accused of crimes
were judged on the degree of harm their actions caused to
society.318 This ideal that "harm to society" is the determining
factor has since evolved to more fully protect the rights of
individuals. Others have said that even with more predictable
criminal justice processes, the CCP's control over Chinese society
still makes the criminal justice process "an abiding stronghold of
politicized administration of law." 319
Courts are still expected to follow policy as it is articulated by
the CCP, most obviously in the campaigns against crime that
have frequently been launched since the 1980s, but more subtly
as well. Although the link between judicial decisions and
general policies are much less explicit and less often
emphasized than they were before the onset of reform, the
courts are expected to apply the laws within whatever
boundaries are set by such policies and must also respond to
changing emphases.3
20
Thus, when a court applies the law, the impediments that
have precluded a more fortified incorporation of individual rights
are the remaining informal political holds on the criminal justice
system. This politicization of the law is also more direct. One
should not discount the fact that representative and populace-
based pressures and policy agendas of the NPC manifest
313. See Huang, supra note 142, at 179-81
314. See LUBMAN, supra note 109, at 15-16.
315. See FAIRBANK, supra note 11, at 52.
316. Leng, supra note 12, at 228-29.
317. See id. at 230-31.
318. See id. at 228-29.
319. Lubman, supra note 28, at 394.
320. Id. at 394-95.
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themselves in an apparently consistent manner. Further, these
forces support new and harsher interpretations of the criminal law
before resettling back into positions that more fully sustain rights
of the accused.
3 21
For example, consider the "strike hard" campaign
implemented in April 1996. Government officials recognized
escalating crime rates and believed harsher police practices were
necessary to fortify national security.322 The NPC granted more
leniencies to police to fight crime and dispensed stricter penalties
on those convicted of crimes.323 What is important about the
campaign was that it was an official government policy established
for a set period of time. The NPC implemented the campaign
seemingly at the behest of societal and populace pressures. The
actual adoption and administration of the harsher policies had
overwhelming support from the populace.
324
Societal pressure and the CCP's desire to stay in power have
inspired debates within government institutions and created
plurality within the NPC. While the CCP remains the dominant
political force in Chinese society, populace pressure begets
pluralism within the Party. Even though the NPC is the primary
lawmaking institution for criminal law and the CCP has great
influence in the NPC, populace pressures do find their way into
the legislative process. There is, however, still a struggle at hand
that indicates populace pressure is relatively more puissant within
the law making process and results in the acceptance of the
application of the letter of the law within the criminal justice
system.
The CCP is promoting gradual reform by granting more
individual rights within codified norms, in other words, balancing
more towards fa at the expense of li. This is what Chinese citizens
favor most. Yet, it is a risky step for the CCP because it has
traditionally relied on li as a power source.
New legal enactments make acceptable norms of behavior
increasingly clear and fortified, but they remain hampered by
informal social norms that control behavior. The formal legal
change and the persona of the law are ahead of the actual
functioning of the law. This is a generalization across provisions,
321. Boxer, supra note 4, at 604-12.
322 See id at 604-05.
323. Id. at 606.
324. See id. at 604.
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but it is by no means a permanent and irrefragable trend. Because
informal and political flexibility in legal interpretation still exists,
intentional and concerted efforts could spawn temporary
movements back toward a deprivation of legal protections. This is
the case with anti-crime movements and political crackdowns that
reform or severely punish the behavior of those who undermine
societal norms. Crackdowns also provide lessons to the rest of
society that will thwart any movements challenging CCP rule or
societal order. To illuminate this trajectory of change more fully, a
recapitulation of the progress of reform with some detail from the




China's codified rules are fundamentally consistent with
international criminal procedure standards. Upon application,
however, the rules do not always conform to international law.
This stems from the use of informal punishments and the
sometimes unfair and unpredictable enforcement of substantive
laws. Thus, individual rights violations arise from the void
between the literal provisions and actual practice. Likewise, policy
prerogatives of other organs of government or the CCP can
interfere with the role of courts, such that independent and
impartial tribunals are lacking. Judges make decisions that may
not provide competent national tribunals. This is due to aspects
such as lack of adequate education for judges,326 or the existence
of weak appeals procedures.
327
While most academic arguments attack the human rights
record of China's criminal justice system, it is helpful to take a step
back and consider the other side of the issue. Underlying the
advocacy for more legal reform is the assumption that for such
change to actually take root, the balance between emphasizing
rights versus majoritarian interests must be modified. Despite
current accusations of human rights abuses, China has made
incredible advancements and will continue to improve its criminal
justice system. From where China came, the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution, those in power have, over the last two decades, taken
325. See infra Table p. 40.
326. See Clarke, supra note 47, at 21-22.
327. See id. at 20-21.
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significant steps to right the wrongs that were done to society and
the innocent.
While the CCP is still the dominant political force in China,
pluralism does exist. New ideas do emerge. They challenge long-
lived social mores and find their way into negotiated and
compromised legislative positions. These differing ideals and
competing pressures spearhead reform. They cause enforcement
institutions and cultural norms to become more consistent with the
written law. If reform is widespread in China, it would be
incorrect to suggest that changes for the better are not occurring.
Positive change is palpable in the criminal justice system, but
at a slower pace than in other areas of legal reform, since reform
annexed to economic development is less subjoined to culture. In
economics, institutional reform agendas can become consistent
with tangible and practical dimensions of the law more rapidly. In
contrast, the criminal justice system is not closely associated with
economic modernization and is intricately tied to traditional
mores. The West must understand that change is occurring. The
change is positive, but demands patience.
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TABLE: TRANSITION FROM LI TO FA
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Practice of Ata
Practice of Fa Actual Pra cticual
Under the Practice: Use e Practice: Use
Legal Issue Li Prior to 1979 Criminal of Both Li and Criminal of Both Li1979 CdFaCriminal adFCode Fa n  a
Code
Length of No clear High arrest Because of the Arrest Decrease in the
Detention arrest standard: "Police high arrest standard use of 1i as
standard. must prove the standard, police lowered to police followed
Length of principal facts of resorted to establishing formal
detention the crime." 328  informal "evidence to detention
guided by Ii Length of detention support the measures.
detention set at methods (SI and facts of the
five and a half Reeducation 
crime."'
329





Presumption Presumption No presumption Considerable Presumption Judiciary
of Innocence of guilt. of guilt or debate as to of innocence: appears to have
or Guilt innocence, whether "No person adopted the
presumption of shall be found presumption of
innocence guilty without innocence but it
existed, being judged is uncertain
as such.
'33°  whether it is
universal.
Right to No right to Seven days prior Often, right to Right to Right
Counsel counsel. to trial, suspects counsel denied, counsel exists sometimes
gained the right at first police compromised
to counsel. investigation because of
or weak status of
immediately lawyers against
after arrest. expansive CCP
interests.
Transparency Trial system Creation of the Debate as to More Transparency
of the Legal opaque and inquisitorial whether this was adversarial has improved
System run entirely process spawned true. procedures but
by CCP. unfairness and a established politicization of
weak appellate clarifying trials and
process. appeal judges remains.
process.
Definition of Courts Crimes defined Defining crimes Crimes no Opportunity for
Crimes defined by analogy to by analogy longer defined substantive and
crimes in ad counter- opened wide by analogy, procedural
hoc fashion. revolutionary door for abuses has
crimes. substantive and narrowed.
procedural
abuses.
328. 1979 CPL, supra note 13, art. 40.
329. 1996 CPL, supra note 170, art. 60.
330. Id. at art. 12.
